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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LARRY M. SEVERSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)
)

DOCKET NO. 42830
Elmore Co. Case No.
CV-2009-1408

)
)
)

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF
ON REVIEW

)
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
In its brief filed in support of its petition for review, which the Court
granted, the state raised two primary reasons this Court should grant review.
Those reasons were summarized in the issues presented on review as:
1.
Is review proper because the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that this Court's resolution of substantive issues under the rubric of
fundamental error in Severson's direct appeal had no preclusive
effect in relation to Severson's post-conviction claim that counsel
was ineffective in relation to those same substantive issues is a
question of substance not heretofore determined by this Court?
2.
Is review proper because the Court of Appeals, contrary to
precedent from this Court, declined to consider whether summary
dismissal was appropriate for the alternative reason that Severson
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failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact in support of his
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor's closing argument?
(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.7.)
In his response brief, Severson complains, in relevant part: "even though
the state is apparently seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals' opinion in full, it
has offered no argument or citation to authority to support this Court overruling
Ticor[Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119,157 P.3d 613 (2007)] and establish a
new test for issue preclusion." (Appellant's Brief on Review, p.9.) Severson then
cites State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996), for the proposition
that a party waives an issue if it fails to support it with argument or authority. 1
(Appellant's Brief on Review, pp.9-10.) To the extent Severson perceives the
state's request for review as including a request that this Court overrule Ticor, he
is incorrect. Moreover, there is no need to overrule Ticor in order to resolve the
issues raised on appeal. In fact, the principles stated in Ticor are likely pertinent
to this Court's consideration of the issues presented in this case.
In Ticor, this Court stated:
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves
the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive
disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated
to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting
the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it
1

This argument, with its reliance on Zichko, misunderstands the scope of this
Court's review. On review, this Court does not review the decision of the Court
of Appeals but "reviews the district court's decision directly." State v. Lampien,
148 Idaho 367, 371, 223 P.3d 750, 754 (2009). The state bears no burden of
showing error by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, Severson, as the appellant,
bears the burden of showing error by the district court. State v. Willoughby, 147
Idaho 482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009). Severson cannot meet his burden of
showing error by claiming the Respondent has not cited authority.
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advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of
repetitive claims.
Ticor, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617 (citations omitted).
Consistent with the foregoing principles, this Court noted in State v.
Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 10 n.1, 966 P.2d 10 n.1 (1998) (citations omitted): "[W]hen
legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction
relief proceeding." It was this principle the state advanced in its Respondent's
Brief. (Respondent's Brief, p.11.) With respect to this assertion, the Court of
Appeals addressed the applicability of issue preclusion to Severson's postconviction claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to portions of the
prosecutor's closing argument. (Opinion, p.9.) In doing so, the Court of Appeals
recited the "five-element test for issue preclusion" as articulated by this Court in
Ticor (Opinion, p.9 (quoting Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618).) Contrary
to Severson's suggestion otherwise, the state has never asserted this test is
incorrect or should be overruled. (See generally Respondent's Brief in Support
of Petition for Review.) The state's only assertion was that the Court of Appeals,
in conducting its analysis, erred in deciding that "issues reviewed on direct
appeal under fundamental error have no preclusive effect to related claims of
ineffective assistance

of counsel

raised

in subsequent post-convictions

proceedings." (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.10.) To
the extent Severson understands the state's argument as something different,
that understanding is incorrect.
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Severson also contends that the state incorrectly claimed in its brief on
review that this Court, on direct appeal, "rejected Severson's argument that
[there] was an improper comment on Severson's Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate

himself

because

it

could

be

'accorded

other

meanings."'

(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.9 (quoting State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439 (2009)) (cited in Appellant's
Brief on Review, p.10.)

Severson argues, "that is not what this Court held."

(Appellant's Brief on Review, p.10.) In support of his argument, Severson notes
this Court analyzed the challenged statement under the fundamental error
standard and contends that the Court's conclusion that the statement did not
amount to fundamental error presents a different issue than whether the
statement was "objectionable misconduct." (Appellant's Brief on Review, pp.1011.) The state is, of course, aware that the Court's analysis of this statement on
direct appeal was done pursuant to the fundamental error standard, but the state
fails to appreciate why Severson finds this fact meaningful. If a statement is not
error, it cannot be fundamental error. While the Court framed the issue in terms
of fundamental error, the following statements made by the Court support the
state's position that the Court rejected the assertion that the prosecutor's
challenged comment did not result in a Fifth Amendment violation:
Although the statement that "[t]his is a circumstantial case,
because nobody was in that house that night but Mary and Larry.
Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened between them"
could be interpreted as a reference to Severson's failure to testify,
it could also be accorded other meanings. For example, the
comment could have been a reference to Dr. Groben's inability to
conclusively establish Mary's cause of death. Because we will not
accord the prosecutor's comment its most damaging meaning, we
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are unwilling to conclude that the prosecutor was referencing
Severson's silence. Nothing in the statement explicitly called for
the jury to infer Severson was guilty because of his silence or to
convict him on that basis. In all likelihood, given the ambiguous
nature of the statement, the prosecutor did not even consider the
interpretation Severson would attach to it.
Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439.
Even recognizing the different standard applicable to claims raised for the
first time on appeal, the fundamental question presented to this Court remains
the same: do the principles of res judicata apply differently to claims considered
on direct appeal pursuant to the fundamental error doctrine as opposed to claims
considered pursuant to an objection? If the answer to that question is no, then
any issue that was decided as part of the Court's resolution of the three closing
argument claims raised for the first time on appeal could not be relitigated under
the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
With respect to the second issue raised on appeal (and on review) whether the district court's summary dismissal should have been affirmed based
on Severson's failure to allege a genuine issue of material fact - Severson
"presum[es]" that "the state is claiming that to survive a summary judgment
motion, [he] needed to present evidence from his prior counsel that their decision
to not object was a reasonable tactical decision" and then asserts "[t]his
argument is ... contrary to this Court's and the Court of Appeals' precedent."
(Appellant's Brief on Review, p.14.)
argument.

The state, however, made no such

What the state did assert, and what is well-established, is that

"Whatever [counsel's] explanation [for not objecting], Strickland requires [the
Court] to 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
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wide range of reasonable professional assistance."'

(Respondent's Brief in

Support of Petition for Review, p.12 (quoting United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d
1440, 1448 (9

th

Cir. 1991) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689

(1984)).) With respect to this standard, the state submitted that Severson failed
to allege a genuine issue of material fact that counsel's performance was
deficient.

(Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.12.)

The

remainder of the state's position on this point will not be repeated here.

(See

Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.12.)
The state will also not repeat its position regarding Severson's failure to
allege a genuine issue of material fact with respect to prejudice.

(See

Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.12-14.) That Severson
believes the evidence against him was not compelling (contrary to this Court's
observation that "there was substantial and competent evidence to support the
jury's conclusion that Severson was guilty of first-degree murder," Severson, 147
Idaho at 715, 215 P.3d at 435), does not mean he raised a genuine issue of
material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on the question of prejudice.
(Appellant's Brief on Review, pp.16-17.) Indeed, the state fails to comprehend
what evidence Severson would present at an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
prejudice. The only "evidence" of prejudice Severson cited in his petition was the
dissenting opinion on direct appeal.

(R., p.70.)

Severson relies on that

allegation "combined with the transcripts of the trial which were submitted in
support of [his] petition" as sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for
an evidentiary hearing. (Appellant's Brief on Review, p.16.) Review of te dissent
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and the trial transcripts does not require an evidentiary hearing.

The district

court could have summarily dismissed this claim based on Severson's failure to
allege a genuine issue of material fact necessitating an evidentiary hearing and,
as such, this Court can affirm the summary dismissal order on this basis.
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,807,839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order dismissing Severson's post-conviction petition.
DATED this 3rd day of April 2015.

JE,S9ICA M. LORELLO
D~l'.lty Attorney General
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